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Drought By Fifth Amendment: Debunking Water
Rights as “Real” Property
“The wars of the twenty-first century will be
fought over water.”
–Ismail Sergaldein 1
I. I NTRODUCTION
The West is experiencing a water crisis. 2 Extreme and severe
drought has taken hold in California, Nevada, Utah, Washington,
and Oregon, 3 brought on by dry weather and rising population.4 California reported record levels of drought with “water supplies . . . severely depleted . . . record low snowpack in the Sierra Nevada mountains, decreased water levels in most of California’s reservoirs,
reduced flows in the state’s rivers and shrinking supplies in underground water basins.” 5 California, in its sixth year of drought, responded with substantial water restrictions aimed at reducing con1. Ismail Sergldein is the former Chairman of the Global Water Partnership. See ALEX
PRUD’HOMME, THE RIPPLE EFFECT: THE FATE OF FRESHWATER IN THE TWENTY-FIRST
CENTURY 12 (2012).
2. U.S.D.A., UNITED STATES DROUGHT MONITOR, http://droughtmonitor.unl.edu
(last updated Apr. 4, 2017).
3. NOAA NAT’L CTRS. ENV’T INFO., STATE OF THE CLIMATE: NAT’L OVERVIEW
FOR AUG. 2015 (Sept. 2015), http://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/sotc/national/201508. The problem is
also prominent in Arizona, Colorado, New Mexico, Texas, and Montana, which have also reported lower than normal water levels. Id. Almost sixty percent of the West is suffering from
moderate to severe drought. Id.
4. Benjamin I. Cook, et al., Unprecedented 21st Century Drought Risk in the American Southwest and Central Plains, SCI. ADVANCES, (Feb. 12, 2015), http://advances
.sciencemag.org/content/1/1/e1400082.
5. Cal. Exec. Order No. B-29-15 (Apr. 1, 2015), https://www.gov.ca.gov/docs
/4.1.15_Executive_ Order.pdf. Although California experienced higher levels of precipitation in
2016, drought persists in California and other Western states as a result of above-normal temperatures. The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration holds the above-normal
temperatures result in “very wet episodes during some months in some regions. These wet
events mask some of the dry episodes on the statewide-scale and seasonal-scale analyses.”
NOAA NAT’L CTRS. ENV’T INFO, DROUGHT – ANNUAL 2016, (Jan. 2017),
https://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/sotc/drought/201613#west-sect; see also Darryl Fears, Has this
year’s record rain finally ended California’s epic drought? Not really., WASH. POST (Feb. 13,
2017, 3:55 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/energy-environment/wp/2017/02/13/
has-this-years-record-rain-finally-ended-californias-epic-drought-not-really/?utm_term=.495
e1daa4140.

409

CARLTON.MACRO.3.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

BYU Journal of Public Law

5/31/2017 5:13 PM

[Vol. 31

sumption. 6 These restrictions have yet to be enforced. Rather, disputes have escalated regarding the extent to which the state can restrict water usage, specifically in the Central Valley region, which is
predominately agricultural and the dominant user of California’s water. 7In 2015, water rights holders, whose rights to draw from rivers
and streams were curtailed, 8 filed lawsuits against the State Water
Board on claims of constitutional violations. 9 The response in California to its water crisis is a sign of what is to come in other western
states as they struggle to address the need for water conservation. In
fact, most states have commenced conservation efforts. Utah commissioned a fifty-year water plan and urged water conservation after a
decline in its snowpack; 10 Nevada is moving towards changes in water
law to incentivize conservation as Lake Mead, which services ninety
percent of Las Vegas’ water needs, experiences lower-than-average
water levels; 11and Arizona issued a state water plan to address how
dwindling supply will meet its ever growing population. 12 Yet, as
states move to assert more control over water resources, there may be

6. Cal. Exec. Order No. B-29-15 (Apr. 1, 2015); see also Darryl Fears, California Officials Say a New Plan Will Make Water Conservation ‘A Way of Life,’ WASH. POST (Dec. 31,

2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/health-science/california-officials-say-a-newplan-will-make-water-conservation-a-way-of-life/2016/12/31/0afb79a2-c869-11e6-bf4b2c064d32a4bf_story.html?utm_term=.51dc1e1c6f00 (discussing California’s efforts to curb water use).
7. Bettina Boxall, Lawsuits Over California Water Rights Are a Fight a Century in the
Making, L.A. TIMES (Jun. 29, 2015, 4:00 AM), http://www.latimes.com/local/california/la-mewater-rights-legal-20150629-story.html.
8. Thirty-six thousand water right holders were told in April 2015 to stop diverting
water from most major river systems. Press Release, Cal. Water Bds., State Water Bd. Warns
that Water Right Curtailments Are Coming Soon (Apr. 3, 2015), http://www.swrcb.ca
.gov/press_room/press_releases/2015/pr040315_ drought_ curtailments.pdf.
9. Dale Kasler & Phillip Reese, Lawsuits Challenge California’s Drought Plan, THE
SACRAMENTO BEE (June 19, 2015, 3:48 PM), http://www.sacbee.com/news/business/article
25022413.html#!. Water restrictions have been particularly been an issue with senior water
right holders who have held their right for over a century. Id.
10. See Press Release, Utah Governor Gary Herbert, Gov. Herbert Encourages Water
Conservation, Plans for Long-Term Solutions (Apr. 9, 2015), http://www.utah.gov/governor/
news_media/article.html ?article =20150409-2.
11. Jeff DeLong, Summit Brings Call for Nevada Water Law Changes, RENOGAZETTE J. (Sept. 25, 2015, 1:13 PM), http://www.rgj.com/story/news/2015/09/25/summitbrings-call-nevada-water-law-changes/72817234/.
12. Arizona is expecting a fifty percent increase in population in the next two decades,
which would require nineteen percent more water than is currently being consumed. See Abraham Lustgarten, Less Than Zero: Despite Decades of Accepted Science, California and Arizona Are Still Miscounting Their Water Supplies, PROPUBLICA (July 17, 2015),
https://projects.propublica.org/killing-the-colorado/story/groundwater-drought-californiaarizona-miscounting-water.
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significant limitations and costs.
Emerging litigation in California highlights the conflict between
the implementation of water restrictions and the exercise of water
rights, primarily in the face of exacerbated drought conditions. 13 A
key concern is whether states should compensate water right holders
for restricting usage. Under the Fifth Amendment, states cannot take
private property “for public use, without just compensation.” 14 Every
state constitution likewise requires a taking of property be justly
compensated. This limits the state’s power and helps ensure a property owner is made whole after the taking occurs. 15Action by states to
curtail the usage of water raises the question of whether restrictions
will be considered a taking that compels “just compensation.” This
paper argues that state and federal courts’ designation of water regulations as takings with the assumption that water rights are traditional
property perpetuates an outdated system of water regulation that fosters waste and non-conservation in the West. Therefore, to ensure
states have the power to protect water sources in the long-term,
courts must revisit the assumption that water rights garner the same
protection as traditional property. Additionally, the public trust doctrine must be raised by courts to allow states to act in the best interest
of the public when regulating water usage.
The purpose of this paper is to evaluate water regulation considering the Fifth Amendment and assess federal and state courts’ interpretations of takings jurisprudence to determine the limitations of
state water conservation efforts. Part II of this Comment discusses
the history of water rights in the West and the persistence of waste
and non-conservation by the prior appropriation doctrine. Part III
surveys federal and state court decisions on the Fifth Amendment regarding water takings. Finally, Part IV considers the power of states
to regulate water use without being subject to the Fifth Amendment’s
13. Mark Fischetti, U.S. Droughts Will Be the Worst in 1,000 Years, SCI. AMERICAN
(Feb. 12, 2015), http://www.scientificamerican.com/article/u-s-droughts-will-be-the-worst-in1-000-years1/. Studies have predicted that advancing climate change will result in “less rain and
greater soil evaporation,” potentially creating the worst droughts since the twelth and thirteenth centuries. Id.
14. See Chicago, B. & Q.R. Co. v. City of Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 239 (1897).
15. See Monongahela Navigation Co. v. United States, 148 U.S. 312, 325 (1893). State
constitutions provide clauses for eminent domain that require just compensation. See, e.g.,
ALASKA CONST., art. I, § 18; ARIZ. CONST., art. II, § 17; CAL. CONST., art. I, § 19(a); COLO.
CONST., art. I, § 15; IDAHO CONST., art. I, § 14; MONT. CONST., art. II, § 29; NEV. CONST.,
art. I, § 22; N.M. CONST., art. II, § 20; OR. CONST., art. I, § 18; UTAH CONST., art. I, § 22;
WYO. CONST., art. I, § 33.
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just compensation requirement.

II. T HE E VOLUTION OF W ESTERN W ATER R IGHTS
Roscoe Pound aptly stated that “the courts of America of the
twentieth century [would] struggl[e] to administer justice to the
crowded, urban, industrial, heterogeneous population . . . on the basis
of the judicial organization devised after the revolution for the homogeneous, rural, pioneer agricultural community of the time.” 16
This is particularly true for the West, as water rights were and continue to be shaped around agricultural usage. 17 Prior to population
growth in the West, courts developed water rights using the doctrine
of riparian rights, adopted from England. 18 Based on this doctrine,
the government granted property owners a right to water based on
the property’s proximity, 19 as “[e]very proprietor of lands on the
banks of a river has naturally an equal right to the use of the water
which flows in the stream adjacent to his lands.” 20 Riparian rights are
only granted to property owners whose property borders the body of
water, and each property owner has a right to an equal share of the
water source. Western states continued to use the doctrine during
settlement of the West, but climate conditions proved to be a challenge to the riparian doctrine.

A. The Rise of Prior Appropriation
Settlements in the West quickly discovered that riparian rights
were unworkable with an arid climate and “would have prevented the
irrigation of the extensive nonriparian lands in the . . . West.” 21 Mining heavily influenced the development of new water rights in the
West, as “[t]he solution was to apply the same doctrine used to settle
mining claims,” 22 which was “the person who is first in time to ap-

16. F. Joyce Cox, The Texas Board of Water Engineers, 7 TEX. L. REV. 86, 87 (1928).
17. A. Dan Tarlock, The Future of Prior Appropriation in the New West, 41 NAT. RES.
J. 769, 770–71 (2001) [hereinafter Tarlock, Future].
18. ROBERT G. DUNBAR, FORGING NEW RIGHTS IN WESTERN WATERS 59 (1983).
19. 1 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS § 6.01 (Amy K . K elley, ed., 3d ed. LexisNexis/Matthew Bender 2015).
20. DUNBAR, supra note 18, at 59 (quotation and citation omitted).
21. Id. at 60.
22. See JOHN W. JOHNSON, UNITED STATES WATER LAW: AN INTRODUCTION 46
(2009).
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propriate water is the first in right.” 23 Prior appropriation, under the
two basic principles of priority and beneficial usage, allocates a water
right to the first person to put a certain quantity of water to beneficial
use. 24 Nineteen states have adopted the doctrine of prior appropriation or a hybrid system, 25 consisting of both riparian and prior appropriation rights. 26

1. Priority of water rights
Prior appropriation helped settle water disputes over who first
had claim to a water source by creating a system of priority. The rule
of priority establishes that water needs of earlier claims (senior rights)
are to be served paramount to any other claim (junior rights). Under
this rule, “[w]hen water is not sufficient to supply all appropriators,
senior appropriators make a call and junior users must shut down
their diversions to enable senior rights holders to fill their needs.” 27
Priority does not give a water right owner the right to possess, but
rather the right to use—this is a “special type of property right” 28 and
when water flow is insufficient, even senior water rights owners are
not permitted to draw water.
Regulation of water rights proved difficult and “[b]y the early
twentieth century, prior appropriation had evolved into an administrative system to allocate unused waters on entire stream systems.” 29All states adopted a permit system, requiring that for a water
right to be granted, a user must show intent to divert the water, put
the water to beneficial use, and demonstrate their intent in an “open
physical manner.” 30 California’s permit system was enacted in 1914,
23. 1 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS, supra note 19, § 12.01.
24. A. Dan Tarlock, Prior Appropriation: Rule, Principle, Or Rhetoric?, 76 N.D. L.
REV. 881, 882 (2000).
25. The riparian doctrine was initially used in the West, however, the West eventually
adopted the prior appropriation doctrine, but rights granted under the riparian doctrine were
preserved. Thus, a hybrid system was established to respect rights established under the earlier
doctrine. See JOHNSON, supra note 22, at 57.
26. Alaska, Arizona, Colorado, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, Utah, and Wyoming have adopted the prior appropriation doctrine; whereas California, Kansas, Mississippi,
Nebraska, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Dakota, Texas, and Washington have
adopted a hybrid system. See id. at 303.
27. Id. at 52.
28. In re McKenna, 346 P.3d 35, 40 (Colo. 2015).
29. Tarlock, Future, supra note 17, at 770.
30. COLO. DIV. WATER RES., OBTAINING A WATER RIGHT (Dec. 2000),
http://water.state.co.us/SurfaceWater/ SWRights/Pages/HowGetWaterRights.aspx.
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after many water rights had already been established, presenting a
complex system of priority in which riparian rights receive higher
priority than prior appropriative rights, pre-1914 rights receive priority over post-1914 rights, and post-1914 rights are last in the line of
priority. 31
Permit systems allow states to monitor and warn individuals of
over appropriation of a water source; 32 over time states have given authority to administrative agencies to issue permits. 33 Administrative
agencies, specifically state water boards, play a significant role in establishing the priority of water rights, regulating beneficial use, and
determining whether the appropriation of water will interfere with
public interests. 34 California’s State Water Board “has two primary
duties: 1) to determine if surplus water is available and 2) to protect
the public interest.” 35 Other Western states have granted similar administrative duties, principally authorizing water boards and departments to retain substantial control over water usage in light of public
interests. 36

31. STATE WATER RES. CONTROL BD., THE WATER RIGHTS PROCESS,
http://www.waterboards.ca.gov/waterrights/ board_info/water_rights_process.shtml (last visited
Oct. 15, 2015).
32. Permits perform the significant role of a recording instrument to establish priority,
and when a permit application is complete, the water date is recognized as the date the right
was established. 1 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS, supra note 19, §15.03. Colorado is the only
state without a permit system, as the Colorado Constitution prohibits it, but has given authority
to a water board to oversee the management of water rights. Water rights are instead established through litigation once a dispute has arisen. See JOHNSON, supra note 22, at 56.
33. Permit systems vary on the type of water they regulate, but most states regulate diffuse surface waters—varying on the exact definition—but typically covering streams, rivers, and
lakes. See 1 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS, supra note 19, §15.02.
CAL.
WATER
CODE,
§
174–89
(2016),
34. See
http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/cgibin/displaycode?section=wat&group=
00001-01000&file=174189.; Ssee also 1 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS, supra note 19, §15.03.
35. United States v. State Water Res. Control Bd., 227277 Cal. Rptr. 161, 169 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1986).
36. SWRCB has power to halt water diversion by water right holders if dry weather
conditions continue. State Water Res. Control Bd., State Water Board Drought Year Water
Actions,
CAL.
ENVTL.
PROT.
AGENCY
(Nov.
2,
2016),
http://www.waterboards.ca.gov/waterrights/water_issues/programs/drought/water_availability.s
html; see also ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 45-105 (2015) (director of the Department of Water Resources given power to regulate water rights); NEV. REV. STAT. § 533.090 (2015) (State Engineer granted significant power of the allocation of water rights); UTAH ADMIN. CODE R65514-3 (2015) (state engineer and Utah Division of Water Rights are granted power to protect
Utah’s water and public welfare).
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2. Beneficial use of water
Water usage is the key to prior appropriation, unlike land ownership under riparian rights, and for a right to be granted “a person
must 1) comply with all statutory requirements, and 2) put the water
to a beneficial purpose. The right remains valid so long as the use
lasts.” 37 Beneficial use conserves water resources by not allowing
claims for an amount, but instead, only for water that would actually
be put to use. States typically have a list of uses they recognize as
beneficial, including domestic use, irrigation, municipal use, stock
watering, mining, water power, and storage and capture of flood waters. 38
Nonetheless, beneficial use is not as rigidly enforced as the rule
of priority. Even though the purpose of beneficial use has been to
prevent waste of scarce water resources, courts are hesitant to revoke
allocations of water as “[w]ater rights became more of a general water
entitlement to use water rather than the right to a specific quantity
used in a non-wasteful manner as specified by the formal doctrine.” 39
The practice of prior appropriation remains substantially different
from the formal doctrine developed in the early settlement of the
West, and has instead evolved from allocating water based on need to
“a mature mixed administrative-property regime.” 40 Rather than successfully managing water systems in the West, the prior appropriation doctrine has led to an over allocation of water rights and a decline in water conservation.

B. The Decline of Beneficial Use and Lack of Water Conservation
Conservation efforts and enforcement of beneficial usage are undermined by the lack of enforcement by state agencies to punish violators of water rights—violations including illegal diversion or waste
of water resources—and instead waste and inefficient incentives pervade western water rights. One farmer in Colorado reported, “When
we have it, we’ll use it . . . . You’ll open your head gate all the way
37. See JOHNSON, supra note 22, at 45.
38. A. DAN TARLOCK, LAW OF WATER RIGHTS AND RESOURCES, § 5:60 (Westlaw,
July 2015) [hereinafter TARLOCK, LAW]. In some cases, uses of water have moved from being
deemed beneficial to wasteful, such as the case in Nevada where the legislature prohibited cities
and counties from using water for artificial lakes and streams. Id.
39. Tarlock, Future, supra note 17, at 771.
40. Id.
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and take as much as you can—whether you need it or not.” 41 Water
right holders worry their rights will be lost if they are not used to
their maximum benefit, even as drought and growth continue to bear
down on the availability of water.
Although the doctrine requires the water to be put to a beneficial
use, prior appropriation has become more of a “shadow doctrine”
with the creation of dams and earlier history promoting the irrigation
of land. 42 “The principal criticisms are that perpetual ‘use it or lose it
rights’ lock too much water into marginal agriculture and generally
encourage inefficient off-stream consumptive uses to the detriment of
aquatic ecosystem values and the needs of growing urban areas.” 43
The concept of waste in water rights does not necessarily entail the
excessive use of water, but rather the choice to not conserve it for future sustainability. 44 For example, older water rights do not need to
share water with developing water needs and instead “flood deep
canyons and literally dry up streams, as has happened with some regularity.” 45 Also, states are hesitant to punish violators of restrictions
on water rights, and in reality “beneficial use” is a loose concept encouraging waste and inefficiency. 46 Even if waste were to occur, states
have not clearly defined waste—essentially because it is difficult to
police water usage for waste; further, state monitoring of water to ensure beneficial use is non-existent. 47 Even state courts rarely enforce
beneficial usage, and rather continue to embrace customs of irrigation. For example, to determine the definition of waste, courts look
to irrigation customs as the standard of whether the water is being
put to beneficial use. 48 This makes it very difficult to break the cycle
of water waste and locks in to place the old system of water rights
without any flexibility in changes to supply and demand.
41. Abraham Lustgarten, Use It or Lose It: Across the West, Exercising One’s Right to
Waste Water, PROPUBLICA (June 9, 2015), https://projects.propublica.org/killing-the-

colorado/story/wasting-water-out-west-use-it-or-lose-it.
42. Tarlock, Future, supra note 17, at 775.
43. Id. at 772.
44. MARC REISNER, CADILLAC DESERT: THE AMERICAN WEST AND ITS
DISAPPEARING WATER 12 (Penguin Books 2d ed., 1993) (1986).
45. Ray Huffaker, et al., The Role of Prior Appropriation in Allocating Water Resources
into the 21st Century, 16 INT’L J. WATER RES. DEV. 265, 267 (2000).
46. Janet C. Neuman, Beneficial Use, Waste, And Forfeiture: The Inefficient Search for
Efficiency In Western Water Use, 28 Envtl. L. 919, 955 (1998).
47. Karen A. Russell, Wasting Water in the Northwest: Eliminating Waste as a Way of
Restoring Streamflows, 27 ENVTL. L. 151, 155 (1997).
48. Neuman, supra note 46, at 955.
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The structure of the prior appropriation rights has led to criticism of the incentives of water right holders to maximize use, rather
than conserve. 49 The foremost criticism of the prior appropriation
doctrine is the lack of flexibility in addressing new demands for water. 50 Prior appropriation grants a vested property right in a water
source, and in turn, states are unable to exercise any control over that
right and “[t]he notion seems to be that to declare an existing use
wasteful, or non-beneficial, is a sort of prohibited ex post facto law
that impairs a vested right.” 51

III. T HE T AKING OF W ATER
In the face of drought, states have struggled to regulate water usage since water rights have been reinforced as a vested property interest. In May and June of 2015, California’s State Water Board issued curtailment notices to senior water rights holders in the
Western Central Valley region of California, with priority dates of
1903 or later. The State Water Board ordered water right holders to
stop the diversion of water due to drought. 52 News sources reported
that many in the region have never had their water curtailed before,
and in response, farmers and ranchers brought suit. 53 In July 2015,
the Superior Court in Sacramento found the curtailment of water in
the West Side Irrigation District resulted in a taking of property, 54
and other districts have since brought suits against the State Water
Board for demanding that senior and junior water rights holders
cease diversion of water in the Central Valley. 55 The State Water
Board already tried to limit the impact of the court’s ruling to only
the curtailment notices and not the ability to regulate water resources
49. Huffaker, supra note 45, at 267.
50. Id. at 272–73.
51. Joseph L. Sax, The Constitution, Property Rights, and the Future of Water Law, 61
U. COLO. L. REV. 257, 258 (1990).
52. Press Release, State Water Res. Control Bd., 2015 Summary of Water Shortage Notices (Sept. 18, 2015), http://www.waterboards.ca.gov/waterrights/water_issues/programs/
drought/docs/curtail_summary_2015.pdf 2.
53. Jim Carlton & Ilan Brat, California Drought Leaves Few Farmers Unscathed, WALL
STREET J. (July 13, 2015), http://www.wsj.com/articles/california-drought-leaves-few-farmersunscathed-1436809802.
54. W. Side Irrigation Dist. v. Cal. State Water Res. Control Bd., No. 34-201580002121,
5
(Cal.
Sup.
Ct.
July
10,
2015),
http://www.waterboards.ca.gov/press_room/press_releases
/2015/west_
side_irr%20_v_cswrcb.pdf.
55. Carlton & Brat, supra note 53.
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in general. 56 Yet, California provides a clear example of the struggle
states will face in regulating water without inviting Fifth Amendment
claims.

A. The Takings Clause
The U.S. Constitution limits government, both state and federal,
from taking private property without just compensation,57 and a form
of the “Takings Clause” has also been adopted by every Western
state in their own constitutions. 58 Takings can either occur directly or
indirectly. A direct taking occurs under the power of eminent domain, when the government condemns a property to be used for a
public purpose and pays compensation for that property.59 An indirect taking arises from an inverse condemnation—physical invasion
of the property (“physical taking”) or government restrictions placed
upon the property (“regulatory taking”) to which compensation has
not been paid. 60
The history of takings has focused on its application to real property. The U.S. Supreme Court in recent years has been expanding
the scope of what constitutes a taking from the original definition,
where the government physically takes property, to a definition including regulatory measures issued by the government limiting what
property owners can do with their property. The earliest case of expansion was Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon, 61 in which the Court held
that if regulation goes “too far” it is considered a taking and the state
must compensate the property owner. 62 Takings jurisprudence further evolved in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, 63
where the Court identified three factors to determine whether a taking has occurred: 1) the economic impact of the regulation, 2) the
owner’s reasonable expectations when he invested in the property,
and 3) the character of the government action, in particular, whether

56.
57.
58.
59.

Id.

U.S. CONST. amend. V, XIV.
See supra note 15.
Raymond Dake, Trout of Bounds: The Effects of the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals’ Misguided Fifth Amendment Takings Analysis in Casitas Municipal Water District v.
United States, 36 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 59, 74 (2011).
60. Id.
61. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
62. Id. at 415.
63. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
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the government action could be characterized as a physical invasion
of the property. 64
Following Penn Central, the Court continued to develop the definition of regulatory takings, including recognizing that a permanent
physical occupation, however minor, destroys all of the owner’s basic
property rights and is therefore a taking. 65 Regulatory measures that
deny the property owner all economically beneficial or productive
use of his land also constitute a taking. 66 Nevertheless, the body of
law surrounding takings has been “described as a ‘mess.’” 67 Takings
jurisprudence has become incoherent due to the number of tests introduced in Mahon, Penn Central, Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 68 and Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council. 69
The question now is how takings jurisprudence applies to water
rights. California’s regulation of junior and senior water rights holders in light of drought conditions displays the predicament of water
conservation efforts. Further, it raises the question of whether water
rights should be designated as a vested property interest. And if so,
what impact does the Fifth Amendment have on water rights?

B. State Courts and Water Takings
The introductory inquiry in takings jurisprudence is whether
there is a property interest to be taken. 70 Contemplating water rights,
many states recognize a vested property interest when the steps to
appropriation are completed and the state administrative agency
awards a final decree. 71 Early state courts declared water rights as “real property,” essentially giving them the same designation as tradi64.
65.
(1982).
66.
67.

Id. at 123.
Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 437–38, 441

Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1016 (1992).
William Michael Treanor, The Original Understanding of the Takings Clause and
the Political Process, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 782, 782 (1995) (quoting Damel A. Farber, Public
Choice and Just Compensation, 9 CONST. COMMENTARY 279, 279 (1992); Saul Levmore, Just
Compensation and Just Politics, 22 CONN. L.REV. 285, 287 (1990)).
68. 458 U.S. at 441.
69. 505 U.S. at 1016.
70. See Bingham v. Roosevelt City Corp., 235 P.3d 730, 736 (Utah 2010). The Utah
Supreme Court has refused “to find a taking in situations where the plaintiffs failed to prove a
‘vested legally enforceable interest.’” Id.
71. James N. Corbridge, Jr., Historical Water Use And The Protection
Of Vested Rights: A Challenge For Colorado Water Law, 69 U. COLO. L. REV. 503, 505
(1998).
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tional property rights. 72 Idaho 73 and New Mexico 74 are the only
courts that continue to acknowledge this, and many states have
moved away from this concept as several state legislatures deem water
as belonging to the “public” 75 and the appropriation of water only
gives the water right holder the ‘right to use.’ Vested water rights do
receive a certain level of protection, and now the question remains
whether water rights have the same constitutional protections under
the Fifth Amendment as traditional property rights. State courts have
made it clear that riparian and appropriative water rights are usufructuary, 76 granting only the right to use and not conferring any private
ownership in a body of water. The unique nature of water rights
granting only the right to use presents a difficult determination of
whether the Fifth Amendment applies when states curtail water
rights.
Riparian water rights have long been subject to the takings clause
under state and federal constitutions. In Franco-American Charolaise, Ltd. v. Oklahoma Water Resources Bd., the Oklahoma Supreme Court determined that the Oklahoma Legislature could not
abrogate riparian water rights without compensation, after it had
passed a statute asserting that riparian water rights were to be limited
to domestic use. 77 It held the statute abolished riparian water rights
that were vested interests and the abrogation of this right was a constitutional taking. 78 Similarly, the Ohio Supreme Court recognized
that “[r]iparian rights are private property within the meaning of the
Constitution. Where the state makes an improvement for a purpose

72. See Olson v. Idaho Dept. of Water Res., 666 P.2d 188, 191 (Idaho 1983); Goodwin
v. Hidalgo Cty. Water Control & Improvement Dist. No. 1, 58 S.W.2d 1092, 1094 (Tex. App.
1933); First Nat. Bank v. Hastings, 42 P. 691, 692 (Colo. App. 1895) (“Water rights for irrigation are regarded as real property.”).
73. See Clear Springs Foods, Inc. v. Spackman, 252 P.3d 71, 78 (Idaho 2010).
74. See Mannick v. Wakeland, 117 P.3d 919, 926 (N.M. 2004) (limiting the concept of
real property to water rights “generally tied to specific land.”); see also Cooper v. Chevron
U.S.A., Inc., 49 P.3d 61, 69 (N.M. 2002).
75. See ARIZ. REV. STAT., § 45-141; CAL. WATER CODE, § 102; NEV. ADMIN. CODE, §
445A.67563(2) (“The purchase of water rights, unless the water rights are owned by a public
water system that is being purchased in an effort to consolidate as part of a program to develop
the capability of a water system.”); UTAH CODE, § 73–1–1(1).
76. See People v. Shirokow, 605 P.2d 859, 864 (Cal. 1980) (both riparian and prior appropriation water rights are usufructuary); Franco-American Charolaise, Ltd., 855 P.2d at 575
(riparian water rights are usufructuary); Edwards Aquifer Auth. v. Day, 369 S.W.3d 814, 842
(Tex. 2012) (riparian water rights are usufructuary).
77. 855 P.2d 568, 572 (Okla. 1990).
78. Id.
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other than the improvement of navigation, which destroys riparian
rights, the owners of such rights are entitled to compensation for the
loss they have suffered.” 79 There are recognized limitations to riparian water rights, as they may be restricted to reasonable use; 80 however, they are vested water rights attached to the land and cannot be
eliminated without compensation. 81
Curtailments of vested water rights under the prior appropriation
doctrine have also been deemed takings by western state courts. 82
This is a rare occurrence, as limitations to water rights have occurred
primarily in the concepts of beneficial use and priority. Limitations
under the beneficial usage doctrine, reducing an appropriated water
right based on wastefulness, do not constitute a taking. 83 Yet, state
courts rarely enforce the concept of water being put to beneficial use,
as irrigation customs determine the standard for waste, making it difficult for state administrative agencies to adapt to changing conditions to ensure water is not wasted. 84
Litigation over water rights arises mainly from disputes over the
administration of priority between junior and senior water right
holders, rather than conservation issues. States have the capability of
regulating water rights, without having to pay compensation, to ensure water usage does not harm appropriated water rights with higher
priority. In Kobobel v. State, Dep’t of Natural Resources, 85 the Colorado Supreme Court allowed the state water engineer to curtail junior water rights in favor of senior water rights. This was a result of an
over-appropriation of water that brought an inherent risk to other

79. McNamara v. Rittman, 838 N.E.2d 640, 645 (Ohio 2005) (citing State ex. rel. The
Andersons v. Masheter, 203 N.E.2d 325, 327 (1964)). See also Wernberg v. State, 516 P.2d
1191, 1194–95 (Alaska 1973) (finding riparian water rights are subject to the Fifth Amendment
and “[t]hese rights are valuable property, and ordinarily cannot be taken for public use by the
federal or state governments without payment of just compensation to the landowner.”).
80. Scranton v. Wheeler, 179 U.S. 141 (1900) (finding destruction of riparian water
rights did not have to be compensated because purpose was not abrogation, but rather, the improvement of public waters granted by the Commerce Clause).
81. Brusco Towboat Co. v. State, By and Through Straub, 567 P.2d 1037, 1046 (Ore.
Ct. App. 1977).
82. Clear Springs Foods, Inc. v. Spackman, 252 P.3d 71, 79 (Idaho 2011) (“When there
is insufficient water to satisfy both the senior appropriator’s and the junior appropriator’s water rights, giving the junior appropriator a preference to the use of the water constitutes
a taking for which compensation must be paid.”).
83. State Dep’t of Ecology v. Grimes, 852 P.2d 1044, 1055 (Wash. 1993) (holding that
beneficial use operates as a limitation to a vested property right).
84. See supra text accompanying note 48.
85. 249 P.2d 1127 (Colo. 2011).
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water rights. 86 The threat to water rights arose over the administrative goal to “maximize the beneficial use of all of the waters of [Colorado]” and the court allowed the state to regulate water within the
limitations of the prior appropriation doctrine. 87 The Colorado Supreme Court in Kobobel suggested that anything outside of those
limitations could qualify as a constitutional taking and that the state
engineer was “merely enforc[ing] Colorado’s long-standing doctrine
in order to address the injurious effects . . . pumping out of priority.” 88 Regulation of water rights is permitted as it gives “its holder the
right to use and enjoy the property of another without impairing its
substance. Thus, one does not ‘own’ water but owns the right to use
water within the limitations of the prior appropriation doctrine.” 89
The current view of state courts is that there are inherent limitations of the prior appropriation doctrine—beneficial usage and priority—which allow states to regulate that water within those limitations. Yet, courts have been unable to adapt to the changing
conditions of water supply and demand in light of drought conditions
and growing populations. Disputes only arise as to issues of priority,
and in rare occurrences as to issues of beneficial usage. But they do
not address the need of the state to regulate a scarce resource in the
face of changing circumstances. State courts have played a minor role
in water takings jurisprudence. Instead, federal courts have shaped
the future of water rights litigation with regards to regulation outside
the inherent limitations of priority and beneficial usage.

C. Federal Courts and Water Takings
The landmark precedent for water takings in the West is Casitas
Municipal Water District v. United States (“Casitas Municipal Water”), 90 which held regulation of a water right constituted a physical
taking. 91 In 1956, the Casitas Municipal Water District (“Casitas”)
and the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation (“BOR”) entered into a contract
regarding the Ventura River Project. 92 The contract stipulated that
86. Id. at 1135.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 1134.
89. Id. (citing Navajo Dev. Co. v. Sanderson, 655 P.2d 1374, 1377 (Colo. 1982)) (internal quotations omitted).
90. 543 F.3d 1276 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
91. Id. at 1282.
92. Id. at 1281.
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Casitas would have the “perpetual right to use all water that becomes
available through the construction and operation of the Project.” 93
Casitas applied to the State Water Board for the appropriation of
those water rights. 94 In 1997, forty years after the project was completed, West Coast steelhead trout were placed on the endangered
list of the Endangered Species Act (“ESA”). 95
Section 9 of the ESA makes it illegal to “take” a species that was
listed as endangered, and under this law, BOR directed Casitas to “(1)
construct a fish ladder facility . . . and (2) divert water from the Project to the fish ladder, resulting in a permanent loss to Casitas of a
certain amount of water per year.” 96 In 2008, Casitas sued the U.S.
Government for an unconstitutional taking of the water they lost in
the diversion. The Federal Circuit made it clear that the Fifth
Amendment was “designed not to limit the governmental interference with property rights per se, but rather to secure compensation in the event of otherwise proper interference
amounting to a taking.” 97 Yet, two aspects of the decision in Casitas
Municipal Water pose significant problems to future regulation of
water: 1) assuming a usufructuary right is a vested property interest
and 2) holding water regulation as a physical taking.
First, the decision in Casitas Municipal Water never directly addresses whether a water right should be subject to a taking. Similar to
state courts, the Federal Circuit assumes a water right is a “vested
property interest.” 98 Yet, a water right is much more limited than the
right associated with traditional property. A water right cannot be
possessed nor is a water right holder given title. Rather, a water right
is limited to the allocation of water given based on the usage. Judge
Mayer, dissenting in Casitas Municipal Water, disagreed with whether Casitas had a property interest in the water. He argued that a usufructuary interest does not give actual ownership over water, as under
California law the public owns all water within California territory,

93. Id. at 1282.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 1288 (emphasis in the original) (quoting First English Evangelical Lutheran
Church of Glendale v. County of L.A., 482 U.S. 304, 315 (1987)).
98. Id. at 1297 (Mayer, J., dissenting) (Judge Mayer highlights in his dissent that this
threshold issue of whether a water right even constitutes a property interest was never addressed by the court).
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and cannot be “physically invaded or occupied,” 99 nor did the government take the water right outright from Casitas and give it to
someone else. 100 He focuses on an important concept that has yet to
be fully answered by state and federal courts: whether a usufructuary
right can and should be subject to the takings clause. As already discussed, many states’ constitutions and water codes hold water as a
public right rather than a private right. This is too important of a
threshold question to be based on assumptions when considering
whether property has been taken.
Second, the most significant holding the Federal Circuit made in
Casitas Municipal Water was that the curtailment of Casitas’ water
right was a “physical taking.” 101 Drawing upon prior Supreme Court
decisions in International Paper Co. v. United States 102and United
States v. Gerlach Live Stock Co., 103 where the government had directly appropriated water the parties had a right to use, the diversion
was deemed a “physical taking” by the Court. The issue in Casitas
Municipal Water differed from this precedent, as the right was “only
partially impaired.” 104 Even though Casitas’ water supply was partially reduced from having to divert the water to the fish ladder, the
court regarded the partial reduction amounted to a taking requiring
the injured parties be compensated. 105
Prior to Casitas Municipal Water, in 2001, the U.S. Federal
Court of Claims decided a similar case, Tulare Lake Basin Water
Storage Dist. v. United States (“Tulare Lake”). 106 An influential factor in the decision of the Court of Claims in Tulare Lake and for the
Federal Circuit in Casitas Municipal Water was the Supreme Court’s
taking analysis in United States v. Causby. 107 The case involved lowflying planes of the Army and Navy over Causby’s property resulting
in the death of his chickens, minor property damage, and devaluation
in the land. 108 The Court held it was a physical taking because the
“frequency and altitude of the flights” made it impossible for the
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
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Id. at 1298 (Mayer, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1297.
Id. at 1295.
282 U.S. 399 (1931).
339 U.S. 725 (1950).

Casitas Mun. Water Dist., 543 F.3d at 1292.
Id.
49 Fed. Cl. 313 (2001).
328 U.S. 256, 265 (1946).
Id. at 258.
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landowners to use the land for any purpose, and it was a complete
loss as if the government had taken exclusive possession. 109 Both Tulare Lake and Casitas Municipal Water analogize water rights to
Causby by declaring that the government had prevented the plaintiffs
from using the water, and thus, the water right became valueless. 110
In using the Causby analysis, both Tulare Lake and Casitas Municipal Water disregard previous Supreme Court caution against treating
all interference as per se takings, as they could “transform government regulation into a luxury few governments could afford.” 111 The
Court thought that “[b]y contrast, physical appropriations are relatively rare, [and] easily identified . . . .” 112
Designation of the reduction in water as a “physical taking” has
been substantially criticized for the impact it will have on water
law. 113 The Federal Circuit concluded that the diversion was a physical taking based on the idea that the government commandeered the
water “for a public use”—the preservation of an endangered species.
When the government commandeered the water by diverting it to
the fish ladder, it took Casitas’ water. 114 “The water, and Casitas’
right to use that water, [was] forever gone.” 115 Shortly after Casitas
Municipal Water, concern arose that the Federal Circuit’s decision
“could potentially convert every regulation of water use into an unconstitutional taking and basically freeze the government in its
tracks.” 116
The Federal Circuit and Court of Claims analysis of water rights
as a physical taking is flawed because it is inconsistent with the nature
of water rights. Water rights lack the physical occupation aspect that
is used in real property takings. Professor John D. Echeverria states,

109. Id. at 261.
110. Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage Dist., 49 Fed. Cl. at 319; Casitas Mun. Water
Dist., 543 F.3d at 1294.
111. See Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 324
(2002).
112. Id.
113. See Dake, supra note 59, at 111–21 (discussing the impact the designation “physical
taking” will have on states with depleting sources in trying to regulate groundwater consumption); A. Dan Tarlock, Takings, Water Rights, And Climate Change, 36 VT. L. REV. 731, 754
(2011–2012) (“The curtailment of a seasonable delivery obligation does not disturb the underlying property or contract right, and thus the proper analysis is the Court’s temporary takings
doctrine.”).
114. See Casitas Mun. Water Dist., 543 F.3d at 1294.
115. Id.
116. Dake, supra note 59, at 111.
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“the physical occupation theory cannot logically be applied to a water
right” because there is no physical property to occupy; rather water is
merely a right to use. 117 Professor Echeverria states that the analysis
by the Court of Claims has given “property rights in water greater
protection than any other type of property known to the law” and
this protection “is inconsistent with the traditionally limited and contingent nature of private rights in water.” 118 The contingency of private water rights rests on the fact that “private rights in water are
subject to greater demands on behalf of the public welfare, and therefore are less appropriate for treatment using a per se takings rule than
other types of property rights.” 119
The concern with Casitas Municipal Water is that any regulation
of water that results in a diminution of a water right could cause a
significant amount of compensation. For a physical taking, the government is required to fully compensate the property for the full value of the property taken. 120 Regulatory takings require the government to compensate only when the regulation “deprives land of all
economically beneficial use.” 121 The Casitas Municipal Water decision could result in compensation as much as $1,349,000, 122 and the
Tulare Lake decision resulted in the government settling for $16.7
million with the water district. 123 Compensation of this magnitude
may deter states from taking any action that would result in any slight
diminution of water rights, and further, it could frustrate the ability
of state legislatures to enact regulation towards water conservation.
117. John D. Echeverria, Why Tulare Lake Was Incorrectly Decided, GEO. ENVTL. L. &
POL’Y INST.14 (Aug. 2005), http://www.gelpi.org/gelpi/current_research/documents/
RT_Pubs_Law_TulareLakeIncorrect.pdf.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. See Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 537 (2005) (quoting First English
Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304, 315 (1987)).
121. Lucas, 505 U.S at 1027; see also Richard A. Epstein, Physical and Regulatory Takings: One Distinction Too Many, 64 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 99 (Mar. 1, 2012),
http://www.stanfordlawreview.org/online/physical-regulatory-takings#footnote_5 (explaining
that the structure of physical and regulatory is already criticized for the unfair outcomes it can
lead to, as “a physical occupation with trivial economic consequences gets full compensation. In
contrast, major regulatory initiatives rarely require a penny in compensation for millions of dollars in economic losses.”).
122. Dake, supra note 59, at 111–12. This estimation is based on $100–$1000 per acrefoot from data gathered for Tulare case. Id. However, on remand the trial court found the takings claim was not yet ripe for Casitas because it had not yet impacted beneficial use. Casitas
Municipal Water Dist. v. United States, 102 Fed. Cl. 443, 478 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (holding that
the claim was not yet ripe for adjudication), aff’d 708 F.3d 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
123. Echeverria, supra note 117, at 1.
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California has already witnessed that courts will hold any restriction
on water in an effort to curb usage as a constitutional taking, causing
the State Water Board to retreat from any effort to curtail water
rights. 124

IV. B ALANCING THE W ATER R IGHT W ITH STATE POWER
The question now remains how courts can create flexibility for
state legislatures with regard to water regulation without running
afoul of the Fifth Amendment. The state and federal courts have created two obstacles that must be addressed in future takings litigation:
1) the treatment of water as a private vested property interest; and 2)
the designation of water regulation as a physical taking. Precedent
requires “just compensation” to water right holders in the event of
water regulation, so how can courts address the need for water conservation without triggering the Fifth Amendment protections?
Courts will have to recognize, first, that water rights are not subject
to the same treatment as traditional private property interests and
state regulation of water is permitted under the police power; and
second, that the public trust doctrine gives public interests priority
over private water rights.

A. Water Systems Belong to the Public
Treatment of water rights as private property by federal and state
courts is in direct conflict with state statutes and constitutions that
treat water systems as belonging to the public. The designation of
permanent public ownership in state constitutions entrusts the state
with managing and protecting water sources for the benefit of the
public, and is typically referred to as the public trust doctrine. This
doctrine has long existed in water rights as they are “subject to a sort
of easement for public navigation and fishing” 125 from which courts
acknowledge that state administrative agencies are authorized “to reconsider past water rights decisions in light of modern public

124. See Press Release, Cal. Water Bds., State Water Board Issues Statement On West
Side
Irrigation
District
Court
Challenge
(July
10,
2015),
http://www.waterboards.ca.gov/press_room/press_releases/2015/
pr071015_westside_statement.pdf.
125. James L. Huffman, Avoiding The Takings Clause Through The Myth Of Public
Rights: The Public Trust And Reserved Rights Doctrines At Work, 3 J. LAND USE & ENVTL.
L. 171, 180 (1987).
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needs” 126 without Fifth Amendment implications. 127 Placing public
interests paramount has broad implications for prior appropriation,
particularly as the West continues to experience growth. California
deems “[a]ll water within the State . . . the property of the people of
the State.” 128 States are entrusted to protect their water systems and,
therefore, any exercise of water rights “is subject to state administration and enforcement.” 129
In some instances, states have already taken measures to sustain
water sources by instituting “minimum instream flow” requirements. 130 Colorado is one of these states and has given its water board
the authority to determine what “may be required for minimum
stream flows or for natural surface water levels or volumes for natural
lakes to preserve the natural environment to a reasonable degree.” 131
Yet, states’ intent to protect water sources conflicts with the appropriation structure and the court’s view of water as a “vested property
interest.” 132 The California Constitution recognizes water as belonging to the public, subject to state regulation and control, and limits
water to reasonable use allowing for the legislature to “enact laws in
the furtherance of [this] policy.” 133 Unlike riparian water rights, prior
appropriation has continually been subject to regulation; a property
owner has no guarantee they will receive water. In particular, water
rights have never been exclusively private or possessory by one property owner. 134
Nonetheless, courts have not recognized the priority of public
needs in water rights, and rather, private property rights continually
protect water rights. The view is that water is entitled to the same
protection as land under takings jurisprudence. But, the Court’s decision in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council suggests that government regulation or taking of vested property rights are not always
to be perceived by courts as per se takings; rather, there is room for
126. Roderick E. Walston, The Public Trust Doctrine in the Water Rights Context, 29
NAT. RES. J. 585, 589 (1989).
127. Id. at 590–91.
128. CAL. WATER CODE, § 102 (West 2016).
129. Reed D. Benson, Maintain the Status Quo: Protecting Established Water Uses in the
Pacific Northwest, Despite the Rules of Prior Appropriation, 28 ENV’T. L. 881, 886 (1998).
130. See WASH. REV. CODE. §§ 90.92.080, 90.22.010 (2016); NEB. REV. STAT. § 46-2,115
(2014).
131. COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-92-102(3) (2015).
132. WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS, supra note 19, at § 15.03.
133. See CAL. CONST. art. 10, §§ 2, 5.
134. See discussion supra Part II.A.1.
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flexibility in takings jurisprudence in light of states’ power over those
rights. 135 There are two principles of takings jurisprudence to be
drawn from Lucas: first, the background principles of property rights
include an understood limitation; and second, the restrictions placed
on that right are a legitimate exercise of the state’s police power.
Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, proposed that when a state
implements regulation that deprives an owner of all beneficial use,
the preliminary inquiry should be whether the property interest was
even “part of [the] title to begin with.” 136 Further, Justice Scalia recognized that property rights are not without their limitations as the
police power acts as a constraint on property rights and a property
owner “ought to be aware of the possibility that new regulation
might even render his property economically worthless. 137
First, background principles of property rights provide limitations of what a property owner can do with a vested property interest.
Originating in either state or federal law, 138 background principles
provide an affirmative defense to takings claims to which the government has the burden of proof in proving that background principles allow them to regulate the property right without triggering the
Fifth Amendment. 139 Riparian water rights have already evoked the
background principles of property rights in establishing preexisting
easements of navigation and fishing. In water takings, courts have not
raised the perspective of Lucas’ background principles of property
rights in regards to appropriative water rights. In Tulare Lake, “[t]he
court recognized that various California legal rules potentially represented ‘background principles’ under Lucas . . . .” 140 Yet, the state
failed to raise those principles regarding water use—particularly beneficial use and public trust doctrine —“but determined that since the
state of California failed to invoke available state rules imposing limits on water use . . . the federal government could not rely on them to
defend its species regulation.” 141

See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1027 (1992).
Id.
Id. at 1027–28.
Michael C. Blumm & Lucas Ritchie, Lucas’s Unlikely Legacy: The Rise Of Background Principles As Categorical Takings Defenses, 29 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 321, 328
135.
136.
137.
138.

(2005).
139. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1030.
140. Blumm & Ritchie, supra note 138, at 329.
141. Id.
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Second, even as takings jurisprudence remains a “mess,” 142 Lucas
highlighted the role of the police power, as recognized by Justice
Holmes in Hudson County Water Co. v. McCarter. 143 Justice
Holmes acknowledged that “[a]ll rights tend to declare themselves to
the absolute extreme” when they are in fact subject to the limitation
by “the neighborhood of principles of policy which are other than
those on which the particular right is founded, and which become
strong enough to hold their own when a certain point is reached.” 144
Background principles of water rights have always been subject to the
police power of a state, even in the early establishment of prior appropriation, as was recognized in Tulare Lake. Prior appropriation in
its early establishment never guaranteed an absolute right to the water, just the use of a particular amount that over time could be modified.
However, courts have been unwilling to recognize those limitations in the face of changing circumstances that require regulation of
water. One of the strongest limitations in all of property is when a
property right is exercised in a manner that is ‘harmful or noxious ’145
Inherent in the background principles of water rights are that public
needs have priority over private water rights. That is not to say the
harm justifies a regulatory taking, but rather, it gives rise to the use of
the police power to regulate without compensation because the
harmful use was never recognized as part of the property right to
begin with. 146 In both regulatory and physical takings, the government can avoid compensation if “the nature of the owner’s estate
shows that the proscribed use interests were not part of his title to
begin with.” 147 This concept is the crux of the ability of states to
regulate water rights without compensation, as water rights were
never intended to be absolute. Within the background principle of
prior appropriation, water rights could not be exercised to harm earlier established rights, including public interests. Thus, water has
never been a “vested property interest” in the traditional sense, and
142. Commentary on takings jurisprudence has recognized the messiness of the doctrine.

See Carol M. Rose, A Dozen Propositions on Private Property, Public Rights, and the New
Takings Legislation, 53 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 265, 285 (1996); J. Peter Bryne, Ten Arguments
for the Abolition of the Takings Doctrine, 22 ECO. L. Q. 89, 90 (1995).
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
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209 U.S. 349, 355 (1908).

Id.

Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1026 (1992).

Id.
Id. at 1027.
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instead, remains a right limited to the extent it harms public rights.
Further, as will be discussed in the next section, the priority of public
interest also remains a background principle of property with respect
to the public trust doctrine, a property principle adopted from English common law.

B. Applying the Public Trust Doctrine
One important background principle of property that places a
limitation upon a property owner is the public trust doctrine. U.S.
courts first raised the public trust doctrine in Illinois Central Railroad
Co. v. Illinois, 148 in which the Supreme Court held that the sovereign
(state or federal) owns all of the navigable waterways and lands lying
beneath them as a trustee for the benefit of the public. 149 “[P]eople of
the state [own and] . . . may enjoy navigation of the waters, carry on
commerce over them, and have liberty of fishing therein.” 150 Created
for navigable waterways, courts have contemplated the public trust
doctrine as a remedy to expand beyond navigable waters and tidelands; Tulare Lake Basin even emphasized that the government had
failed to raise the “public trust doctrine.” 151 Courts in California and
North Dakota recognize the doctrine; the North Dakota Supreme
Court recognizes that the public trust doctrine plays an expanding
role in environment law and suggests the doctrine requires “as a minimum, evidence of some planning by appropriate state agencies and
officers in the allocation of public water resources.” 152 California has
expanded their use of the doctrine—evident in their landmark decision in National Audubon Society v. Superior Court. 153
The California Supreme Court in National Audubon Society
held that the principle of public trust prevents any party from acquiring a vested right to appropriate water in a manner harmful to the interests protected by the public trust. 154 The case involved the City of
148. 146 U.S. 387 (1892).
149. Id. at 120–22.
150. Id. at 118.
151. Tulare Lake Water Basin Water Storage Dist. V. United States, 49 Fed. Cl. 313, 332
(2001) (“Thus, while we accept the proposition that plaintiffs have no right to use or divert water in an unreasonable manner, nor in a way that violates the public trust, the issue now
before us is whether such a determination has in fact been made.”).
152. United Plainsmen Ass’n v. N.D. State Water Conservation Comm’n, 247 N.W.2d
457, 463 (N.D. 1976).
153. 658 P.2d 709 (1983) (en banc).
154. Id. at 712.
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Los Angeles’s diversion of four of the five tributaries into Mono
Lake, a large saline lake located near the Sierra Nevada mountain
range, to which they had been granted appropriative rights. The diversion caused the level of the lake to drop, and “surface area has diminished by one-third; one of the two principal islands in the lake has
become a peninsula, exposing the gull rookery there to coyotes and
other predators and causing the gulls to abandon the former island.” 155 National Audubon Society, a non-profit organization focused on wildlife conservation, brought suit against the City of Los
Angeles claiming the lake was protected by the public trust. 156 National Audubon Society claimed Mono Lake would continue to diminish and harm not only wildlife but also the public, as the exposed
lakebed would result in airborne dust “irritat[ing] the mucous membranes and respiratory systems of humans and other animals.” 157 The
California Supreme Court addressed in National Audubon Society
the interaction between the public trust doctrine and the water rights
system. 158
To determine how the public trust doctrine applied to California’s water system, the court examined the 1) purpose, 2) scope, and
3) duties and power of the trustee. 159 First, the purpose of the trust
was to protect public rights of navigation and fishing, yet it has since
expanded to tidelands (i.e. Illinois Central Railroad Co.), and in some
cases, the protection of ecosystems. 160 Second, the scope of the trust
historically applied to navigable waterways; however, the court expanded the scope of the trust to “beds, shores and waters” of lakes
that “are without question protected.” 161 The court’s justification for
expanding the doctrine was based on earlier California Supreme
Court cases that used the doctrine to prevent mining companies from
dumping fill into rivers that prevented navigation, caused water pol155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 716. The threat to the public was not exactly determined, but a similar occurrence happened in Owens Valley, California. The City of Los Angeles diverted water from
Owens Lake and the lakebed became exposed resulting in air quality issues. Los Angeles later
reached a settlement for the air quality issues in Owens Valley. See Times Editorial Board, Editorial, 100 Years Later, The Dust Settles In The Owens Valley, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 16, 2014,
http://www.latimes.com/opinion/editorials/la-ed-owens-valley-settlement-20141116story.html.
158. Id. at 717.
159. Id. at 719.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 720.
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lution, and potentially “creat[ed] the danger that in time of flood the
rivers would turn from their channels and inundate nearby lands.” 162
The expansion of the public trust doctrine by the California Supreme
Court suggests that the doctrine could reach as far as non-navigable
waters, so long as they intersect, as “it should equally apply to constrain the extraction of water that destroys navigation and other public interests.” 163 Third and finally, the duties and powers of the trustee are to supervise and ensure that no vested right holder “use[s]
those rights” to harm the trust. 164 Further, the court recognized that
as a usufructuary right, water could not be owned and the right was
limited to use. California, in 1926, passed a constitutional amendment, Article 10, altering water rights by subjecting them to reasonable use. After the legislature passed the amendment, it granted the
State Water Board incremental power to supervise and oversee the
water rights system. 165
Part of this power was to administer the public trust, as California’s alteration of water rights included making public needs superior
to any subsequent rights. Addressing concerns about water rights that
existed prior to the constitutional change, the court stated:
Once the state has approved an appropriation, the public trust imposes a duty of continuing supervision over the taking and use of
the appropriated water. In exercising its sovereign power to allocate
water resources in the public interest, the state is not confined by
past allocation decisions which may be incorrect in light of current
knowledge or inconsistent with current needs.
The state accordingly has the power to reconsider allocation decisions even though those decisions were made after due consideration of their effect on the public trust. The case for reconsidering a
particular decision, however, is even stronger when that decision
failed to weigh and consider public trust uses. 166

This does not guarantee that the public trust will prevail over appropriative rights in every instance that the State Water Board curtails water, rather the public trust will only be invoked when they
“consider the effect of such diversions upon interests protected by the
public trust, and attempt, so far as feasible, to avoid or minimize any
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.

Id. at 720.
Id. at 721.
Id. at 720.
Id. at 725.
Id. at 728.
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harm to those interests.” 167 Nonetheless, the California Supreme
Court granted substantial power to the state to regulate water to ensure the public interests are not harmed by appropriated water rights.
National Audubon Society has been acknowledged by states as a
way to assert control over water allocation. 168 Alaska, 169 Arizona, 170
Idaho, 171 Hawaii, 172 Montana, 173 Nevada, 174 North Dakota, 175 South
Dakota, 176and Washington 177 recognize “the connection between water rights and the public trust law.” 178 However, the rise of the public
trust doctrine over appropriative rights does not give the state unlimited power to regulate water, but gives the state power as a trustee to
preserve water sources, as a trust, “so far as consistent with the public
interest.” 179 The power granted to the State to regulate water allocation does not conflict with the Supreme Court’s view of takings in
Lucas; rather, the majority created flexibility within takings jurisprudence for states to regulate property interests so long as the background property principles have recognized restrictions on the property right. Casitas Municipal Water did not take into account the
restrictions on water rights with regard to the public trust doctrine;
167. Id. at 712.
168. See Michelle Bryan Mudd, Hitching Our Wagon To A Dim Star: Why Outmoded

Water Codes And “Public Interest” Review Cannot Protect The Public Trust In Western Water Law, 32 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 283, 297–98 (2013) (explaining that many states after National
Audubon Society have tried to adopt the public trust doctrine in their water codes).
169. ALASKA CONST. art. VIII, §§ 3, 13; see also Pullen v. Ulmer, 923 P.2d 54, 60–61

(Alaska 1996) (recognizing the public trust doctrine as established in the Alaskan Constitution).
170. San Carlos Apache Tribe v. Super. Ct. ex rel. Cty of Maricopa, 972 P.2d 179, 199
(Ariz. 1999) (rejecting the legislature’s intent to abolish the public trust doctrine).
171. See Kootenai Envtl. All. v. Panhandle Yacht Club, 671 P.2d 1085, 1094 (Idaho
1983) (citing the reasoning of Nat’l Audubon Soc’y in recognition of the public trust doctrine).
172. HAW. CONST. art. XI, §§ 1, 7 (1978); see also In re Water Use Permit Applications,
9 P.3d 409, 445, 453 (Haw. 2000) (citing the reasoning of Nat’l Audubon Soc’y in recognizing
the public trust doctrine, which is also established in the Hawaiian Constitution).
173. See Montana Trout Unlimited v. Beaverhead Water Co., 255 P.3d 179, 185–86
(Mont. 2011) (recognizing the existence of the public trust doctrine for recreational use of
Montana’s waters).
174. See Lawrence v. Clark Cty., 254 P.3d 606, 612–13 (Nev. 2011) (acknowledging that
water within Nevada belongs to the public and provides grounding for the public trust doctrine).
175. See United Plainsmen Ass’n v. N.D. State Water Conservation Comm’n, 247
N.W.2d 457, 463 (N.D. 1976).
176. See Parks v. Cooper, 676 N.W.2d 823, 838 (S.D. 2004) (citing that history and precedent have led to the public trust doctrine).
177. See Rettkowski v. Dep’t of Ecology, 858 P.2d 232, 234 (Wash. 1993) (finding that
the public trust doctrine comes from the state water code).
178. Mudd, supra note 168, at 304.
179. Nat’l Audubon Soc’y, 658 P.2d at 728.
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therefore, the physical takings analysis remains flawed and should not
be adopted by future courts. 180 Yet, takings jurisprudence is recognized as incoherent 181 and one cannot blame lower courts for struggling to make sense of the Supreme Court’s evolving view of takings.
Within takings jurisprudence, California remains an outlier in regards to water takings, as many states have yet to afford their water
boards the same power that California has. So what does this mean
for western states? Western state legislatures and courts will have to
recognize the need for change to their water rights systems—not just
pertaining to the lack of oversight and regulation, but also the power
administrative agencies have in asserting their rights of regulation.

V. C ONCLUSION
The water crisis in the West has highlighted a need for change in
western water systems. Yet, state and federal courts continue to preserve an outdated system that puts the supply of water in the West in
jeopardy. Even as history led to the creation of regulatory systems to
monitor and oversee water rights, significant obstacles remain for
states in their ability to exercise that power. Courts should reconsider
the designation of water regulations as takings by recognizing the
background principles of property rights.
First, water should not be considered a “vested property interest”
to be possessed or owned, but rather, should be subject to state police
power to regulate and restrict water based on priority and beneficial
use. Second, water rights are subject to the public trust doctrine that
protects the public interest in water resources. Therefore, public interests should be prioritized over private rights in the face of significant threats to water sources. A compelling government interest
needs to be recognized that in order to protect water sources for future sustainability, the public interest outweighs private rights to water. The difficulty for courts will be finding a balance between private
water rights and public needs to ensure that neither put the other at
risk of significant harm.
It is apparent that water rights can no longer remain entrenched
in past customs of irrigation and usage. Water rights should instead

180. Judge Mayer raised this issue in his dissent that California subjects appropriated waters to reasonable use and the public trust doctrine. Casitas Municipal Water Dist. v. United
States, 543 F.3d 1276, 1297 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (Mayer, J., dissenting).
181. See Treanor, supra note 67, at 812.
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embrace change that seeks to ensure long-term water preservation.
To address the need for change, courts must first recognize the limitations of water rights inherent in the history of prior appropriation,
namely, that water rights holders are limited to a right to use. Second, courts must recognize that the public trust doctrine grants states
the ability to regulate water systems with concern to public needs.
The connection between water rights and the public trust doctrine
allows public interests to be prioritized before all other water right
holders. These considerations are necessary to make certain that
states do not trigger the compensation requirement of the Fifth
Amendment and create an onslaught of compensation with the
slightest reduction in water usage. These considerations will give
states the power to safeguard the future of water in the West.
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